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LITERATURE
This compilation includes brief
overviews of particular articles
appearing in other law reviews
within the past year which may
be ofuse orinterestto theDePaulLCA Journal of Art and Entertainment Law's readership.

UPDATE

ment funds and interest in protecting freedom of expression,
the judiciary must ensure that
these funds are allotted in a way
that does not penalize or intimidate expression.

Columbia Law Review
Brooklyn Law Review
1990 Vol. 56
Nahitchevansky, Free Speech
and Government Funding: Does
the Government Have to Fund
What it Doesn't Like?
[pp. 213-263].
This note examines the controversy surrounding government
funding and the arts. Focusing
on the issue of free speech, the
author emphasizes the problems which arise when the government is allowed broad discretionary authority in deciding
which organization should receive funding. He argues that
the government does not have
constitutional authority to base
the granting of funds upon a relinquishment of rights of free expression or the authority to
withhold subsidies from specific
groups so as to suppress potentially dangerous ideas based
upon the applicant's political
views, religious beliefs, or activities. The author points out that
many of these organizations
have no alternative source of
funding and are therefore unable to remain in existence without government aid. Thus, the
government's denial of funds
has indirectly suppressed the
first amendment rights of many
speakers. The author concludes
that the low standard of review
which is usually applied by the
courts in these cases gives too
much authority to the government and that, given the increased importance of governSpring 1992
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1991 Vol. 91
Pak, Free Exercise, Free
Expression, and Landmarks
Preservation. [pp. 1813-1846].
This article is concerned with
the restrictions that landmarks
preservation places on expression and property rights. The focus is on the practices of religious groups and the restrictions
placed upon their artistic expression due to landmark designations. Once it is established
that architecture is expression,
as the author argues that it is,
the use of landmark law is problematic. It is an issue of contentspecific regulation with regard
to aesthetics which freezes the
owners' ability to express themselves through their property.
The author suggests that a possible compromise between the
interests of the state in preserving its heritage and each owner's
property rights would be to afford first amendment protection
only to the expressive elements
of the structure rather than the
whole building. He also argues
that only high value expression
should be protected, such as religious structures, and that private or personal messages in architecture should not receive
protection because they are not
meant for a general audience.
The article concludes with an
in-depth analysis of the importance of allowing freedom in religious architecture and the
harm that can result by stifling
such expression. The author

posits that only highly valued
expression should be protected
for "then the property owner's
right to express himself will be
protected without undermining
the state's legitimate interest in
preserving architectural heritage."

Cornell Law Review
1991 Vol. 76
Carleton, Copyright Royalties
for Visual Artists: A Display
Based Alternative to the Droit de
Suite. [pp. 510-547].
This commentary addresses the
issue of the rights of visual artists; specifically the need for the
right to royalties that other artists possess. The Copyright Act
would need minor revision and a
repeal of section 109(c) in order
to grant these rights to the visual artists. The author argues
that visual works are closer to
the already protected areas of
musical and dramatic performances. The nature of an original
is closer to a performance than
it is to any other type of copy and
this theory is supported by the
fact that there is a right of public
display. The Copyright Act defines an exclusive right to public
display of works of visual art in
section 106(5). Unfortunately,
this right to public display is
limited by section 109(c) (unlike
the other rights provided to the
copyright holder under the Act)
in that it does not survive transfers of ownership. The author
argues that section 109(c)
should be repealed and then delineates the minor revisions that
would be necessary in order to
facilitate the artist's use of the
display right after the work has
changed hands. In the alternative, two models are set out
through which royalties for the
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visual artist might be based outside of the Copyright Act: the
droit de suite, and the "exhibition royalty." The article concludes with an update of the bills
currently before Congress that
aim to increase the rights of visual artists, and the proposition
that it would actually make the
Copyright Act more consistent
to grant royalty rights to artists.

Georgia Law Review
1991 VoL 25
VerSteeg, Iguanas, Toads, and
Toothbrushes: Land Use
Regulation of Art as Signage.
[pp. 437-488].
This article concerns land use
regulations pertaining to private property in order to monitor the aesthetics of the community. Among other things, these
laws are applicable to billboards
and advertising signs. The
author states that recent zoning
violators have been recorded
only to find out that those who
erected the structures in questions intended them as pieces of
art and not as signs. He argues
that these art/sign issues indicate a failure of zoning officials
to lay out a reasonable inquiry
to follow in order to determine
the status of these works and
proposes that the proper tool
needed to settle the controversy
is a well-constructed statute
containing a standard definition
of "sign." Model definitions are
suggested and the author additionally asserts that trademark
law should be referenced when
there is difficulty determining to
which category a work belongs
to. The article concludes with a
policy argument against classifying works of art as signs. The
reality of the issue is that much
public access to art and support
of the arts comes from corporate
America through their purchase
of art for public display. This
support will be curtailed if the

work becomes a "sign" and thus
must be removed as a zoning
violation.

Stanford Law Review
1991 Vol. 43
Reichman, Goldstein on
Copyright Law: A Realist's
Approach to a Technological
Age. [pp. 943-980].
This commentary provides an
overview of the treatise by Professor Paul Goldstein entitled
COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW
AND PRACTICE. The author discusses Professor Goldstein's
utilitarian approach to copyright law as a whole and evaluates Professor Goldstein's efforts to describe the nuances
that have slipped into the originality requirement since the
Copyright Act of 1976 was enacted. Reichman focuses on the
heart of Professor Goldstein's
treatise by piecing together his
innovative, highly contextual
approach to infringement which
digresses from the standard approach in four major ways. The
author continues with a brief
discussion of Professor Goldstein's treatment of international interests and the possible
clash between the utilitarian
bias of domestic law and the
broader policies underlying foreign law. Finally, the author concludes with the acknowledgement that many scholars
may disagree with Professor
Goldstein's theories; however,
the author predicts the treaty
will have a positive impact on
the future development of domestic copyright doctrine.

University of Miami Law
Review
1990 Vol. 44
Silvergate, Subliminal
Perception and the First
Amendment: Yelling Fire in a
Crowded Mind? [pp. 1243-1281.
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This article discusses the affects
of subliminal messages in advertising and artistic expression
and examines the first amendment protection that should be
afforded to both. The author discusses the narrowly defined
classes of speech that are not
protected under the first amendment and examines the possible
categorization for subliminal
communication. After an interesting discussion, Silvergate
concludes that subliminal communication does not neatly fit
into any of the categories of restricted speech. Accordingly, he
advocates that the category of
subliminal communication encompassing artistic expression
be afforded greater protection,
because artists have historically
been employing subliminal techniques with the support of the
First Amendment.

Wisconsin Law Review
1991
Levy, Liability of the Art Expert
for Professional Malpractice.
[pp. 595-651].
This is no longer an era when an
expert may casually give his or
her opinion as to the authenticity or value of a piece of artwork.
Art experts today are expected
to thoroughly examine their
work, consult appropriate material and specialties, perform scientific tests, keep clear of financial conflicts of interest, and
possess qualifications to be competent to voice opinions. This article analyzes the responsibility
of art experts to their clients as
well as a responsibility to the
public which transcends that relationship. The author first discusses the standard of care required in this field, because
most art expert malpractice
cases arise from negligent professional opinion. Levy states
that an art expert is only required to possess the skill and
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learning ordinarily found in
other experts in the same locality and under the same circumstances, and that the appropriate standard of care is "due
diligence" and "due care." He advises that client agreements be
in writing because in the absence of such an agreement, custom and usage will be referenced. In addition, Levy notes
that courts now recognize that
the mood of an art market may
be reflected in an opinion, thus
permitting vastly different results in estimates of the same
work if they are made at different times. In summary, the
author recommends that to ease
concerns over liability, the ex-
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perts should acquire malpractice insurance, be familiar with
the applicable standard of care,
and recognize the limits of his or
her own competence.

Yale Law Review
1990 VoL. 99
Adler, Post-Modern Art and the
Death of Obscenity Law. [pp.
1359-1378].
This discussion explores the
controversy of the Miller obscenity test as it applies to post-modern art. The author feels that the
Miller court, which assumed
that serious artistic value provided a functional standard that
could differentiate between

sexually explicit art and obscenity, did not provide a sound
standard for determining obscenity in light of recent developments in the art world. This
article examines the intersection which has occurred in modern times between art and obscenity and focuses on a group of
post-modern artists who defy
the standards of serious artistic
value. The author concludes
that the standard of serious artistic value may be workable if
post-modern artists could find
art critics to proclaim that their
creations are, in fact, art. Q
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